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In his seminal 1925 essay “The Literary Criticism of Oratory,” Herbert Wichelns 
contrasted the avocations of literary and rhetorical criticism. He concluded that 
rhetorical criticism’s “point of view is patently single. It is not concerned with per-
manence, nor yet with beauty. It is concerned with effect.” Wichelns’s next sen-
tence indirectly inserted an adjectival modifier before the word effect which 
narrowed its semantic potential. He wrote: Rhetorical criticism “regards a speech 
as a communication to a specific audience.” By emphasizing that public discourse 
always addresses specific audiences, and suggesting that the rhetorical critic should 
focus his or her analytic attention on “the orator’s method of imparting his [sic] 
ideas” to the specific audience, Wichelns circumscribed the range of discursive 
effects which the critic might examine. For example, focusing on how a message 
affects the specific or extant audience diminishes the temporal reach of discursive 
action. Wichelns appears to have assumed that discourse exhausts its rhetorical 
potential, its ability to exert influence, in the moment of immediate audience 
reception.1
Surveying the metacritical literature in rhetorical studies in the mid-twentieth 
century, we find a handful of essays questioning the restricted approach to discur-
sive effect that Wichelns’s essay helped instigate.2 We also discover essays such as 
Lloyd Bitzer’s influential “The Rhetorical Situation” that provided conceptual 
reinforcement for an emerging “instrumental” critical paradigm organized around 
a circumscribed view of effect. Through concepts such as “exigence” and “con-
straint,” Bitzer’s reconstruction of rhetorical situations included more factors than 
immediate audience; he nevertheless buttressed an instrumental approach to dis-
cursive effect. According to Bitzer’s formulation, discourse engaged or resolved 
urgent, objective problems (exigencies) while managing or negotiating various 
obstacles (constraints). Public discourse, Bitzer insisted in 1968, functioned instru-
mentally, enabling individuals and groups to respond to preexisting situations.3
While Bitzer’s account of rhetorical situations advanced an instrumentalist criti-
cal orientation, other scholars began developing concepts such as “rhetoric is 
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 epistemic,” the “ego-function” of rhetoric, and “fantasy-theme analysis,” which 
indirectly challenged a narrow account of discursive effect.4 Indebted to these 
internal conceptual developments as well as to developments in other disciplines, 
rhetoricians began urging the discipline to rethink the concept of effect in the early 
1980s.5 In his review of the 1984 University of Iowa conference on “The Rhetoric 
of the Human Sciences,” John Lyne suggested that the “constitutive function of 
rhetoric … should probably get more attention in our literature than it does, since 
it helps explain why the study of discourse is important independent of whether it 
can be demonstrated to have ‘caused’ events.”6 In his review, Lyne contrasted a 
narrow, “causal” model of effect with one that is more capacious, and like others, 
he urged scholars to embrace a more expansive understanding of discursive effect. 
Lyne’s contrastive terminology – the idea of rhetoric’s “constitutive function” – 
has become an important part of the contemporary rhetorical lexicon.7
Two scholars in particular helped popularize what we might call a constitutive 
framework for rhetorical criticism and public address scholarship. Maurice Charland 
and James Boyd White developed their conceptualizations of “constitutive rheto-
ric” independently, drawing largely on different theoretical traditions. Charland 
was heavily influenced by Kenneth Burke as well as by various strands of continen-
tal philosophy and social theory (especially Louis Althusser);8 in one of his early 
books White identified a number of writers who influenced his approach to lan-
guage and rhetoric, including so-called “New” Critics and reader-response scholars 
in American literary studies, language philosophers such as Wittgenstein, Austin, 
and Searle, and of course Kenneth Burke.9 While the different intellectual tradi-
tions from which they draw will allow us to contrast Charland and White’s perspec-
tives, at this point we would like to highlight their shared assumptions. Reflecting 
on a variety of contemporary theoretical traditions, including language philosophy, 
literary and philosophical deconstruction, and poststructuralism, we contend that 
Charland and White’s versions of “constitutive rhetoric,” as well as the various 
critical studies which have tried to develop and expand on their perspectives, share 
basic social constructionist assumptions about the contingency of human beliefs 
and institutions and the generative potential of discursive action.10
Jasinski suggests that the constitutive “turn” in contemporary rhetoric is “both a 
return to a neglected aspect of the rhetorical tradition and an encounter with a broader 
‘constructivist’ or structurational agenda in the humanities and social sciences.” He 
identifies the rejection of “the once traditional view that language is principally a 
medium of representation” as a crucial assumption shared by social constructionists. 
Constructivism and constitutive rhetoric, he continues, advance the somewhat para-
doxical position that “linguistic or discursive practices create what they describe as 
they simultaneously describe what they create.” As a brief summary description of the 
constitutive potential inherent in discursive practice, Jasinski endorses Louis Montrose’s 
statement that “representations of the world in … discourse are engaged in construct-
ing the world, in shaping the modalities of social reality, and in accommodating their 
writers, performers, readers, and audiences to multiple and shifting subject positions 
within the world they both constitute and inhabit.”11
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In his 1998 essay in Doing Rhetorical History, Jasinski modifies Michael Leff’s 
distinction between two senses of persuasion – intentional and extensional – in 
order to locate two distinct trajectories of constitutive influence or effect.12 Jasinski’s 
effort, we believe, is consistent with recent attempts to distinguish between a 
“rhetoric of interiors” and a “rhetoric of exteriors.”13 In the next section of the 
chapter, we draw on Charland, White, and other examples of constitutive critical 
analysis to outline important themes and questions that might guide interior and 
exterior modes of constitutive critical inquiry. In the third section of the chapter, 
we illustrate each analytic trajectory in an extended discussion of the Virginia and 
Kentucky Resolutions drafted in 1798 by, respectively, James Madison and Thomas 
Jefferson. Examining their constitutive legacy is appropriate since the Resolutions 
were an instrumental failure in their immediate historical context, yet they rather 
quickly became canonized as the “principles of ’98.”
Interior and Exterior Trajectories 
of Constitutive Analysis
Jasinski initially adumbrates the two trajectories in the following terms: “Inten-
tionally, texts exhibit constitutive potential through the invitations inscribed in 
various discursive forms (tropes, arguments, etc.). Extensionally, texts exhibit con-
stitutive force through the cultural circulation and discursive articulation of its 
textual forms in ways that enable and constrain subsequent practice.”14 While we 
find this initial formulation useful, we will organize our discussion in terms of inte-
rior and exterior constitutive rhetorics because the term “intention” often con-
notes an instrumental critical logic. Beginning with Charland and White and 
continuing through more recent studies by Vanessa Beasley, Nathaniel Cordova, 
and Dexter Gordon,15 critics have examined textual interiors – the various discur-
sive forms which inhabit or reside in the text – in various ways, thereby uncovering 
a text’s constitutive capacity (or capacities) and its potential to shape audience 
identity, communal values, and social reality.16
Charland’s 1987 study of Quebec nationalism concentrates on the Parti 
Québécois White Paper “Quebec-Canada: A New Deal,” released in November 
1979. He focuses on the White Paper’s historical narrative of oppression combined 
with “a teleological movement towards emancipation,” arguing that “within the 
formal structure of a narrative history … it is possible to conceive of a set of indi-
viduals as if they were but one.” He continues a paragraph later: “Form renders the 
‘Québécois’ a real subject within the historical narrative.” Charland qualifies this 
claim a few paragraphs later, remarking: “The ideological effects of constitutive 
rhetoric that I have outlined are not merely formal effects inscribed within the 
bracketed experience of interpreting a text. In other words, these do not only per-
mit a disinterested understanding of a fictive world.” In our reading, Charland 
attempts to transcend an analysis of textual interiors – reconstructing the White 
Paper’s historical narrative of oppression – by suggesting that such an analysis of 
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interior form only provides access to “a fictive world.” He insists that his analysis 
of “[t]he White paper’s constitutive rhetoric, as it articulates the meaning of being 
‘Québécois,’ is not a mere fiction. It inscribes real social actors within its textual-
ized structure of motives, and then inserts them into the world of practice.” From 
our perspective, Charland’s effort to link interior form with fiction, thereby exceed-
ing an interior mode of analysis, represents a canard. Despite claims to the con-
trary, Charland’s analysis concentrates on narrative form, making no effort to trace 
the White Paper’s circulation or to disclose the way Quebec citizens used it to 
shape their “practices” or their understanding of social reality. It remains a concep-
tually sophisticated, but nevertheless interior, mode of constitutive analysis.17
Charland’s conceptual sophistication stems from the way he employs the work of 
Louis Althusser to describe a “rhetoric of interpellation.” By following “the radical 
edge of Burke’s identificatory principle,” Charland attempts to surmount the 
model of instrumental persuasion, and in so doing, he discovers Althusser’s con-
cept.18 According to Charland, interpellation is not the result of rhetorical appeal; 
it emerges in “the very act of addressing,” and “occurs at the very moment one 
enters into a rhetorical situation … as soon as an individual recognizes and acknowl-
edges being addressed.” By “participat[ing] in the discourse that address[es]” 
them, people are “inscrib[ed] … into ideology,” inserted into specific “discursive 
position[s].” Rhetorical interpellation, Charland concludes, is the principal appara-
tus of constitutive rhetoric, and “collective identities” are the primary “ideological 
effect” of rhetorical interpellation.19
A number of rhetorical scholars have followed Charland’s lead in probing the 
way various discursive forms – narrative in particular – function to constitute iden-
tities. For example, Beasley draws upon Charland’s discussion of Burke and 
Althusser, arguing that “to find evidence of how presidents have promoted certain 
forms of American national identity within their discourse, we need not look for 
overt appeals in which chief executives have told their listeners what to think or 
which policy to support. Instead, critics can look at ways that presidential discourse 
subtly reinforces the audience’s presumed collective identity as national subjects.” 
While locating a variety of “constitutive themes of American nationalism,” she 
concludes that presidents have “most commonly associate[d] American national 
identity with Puritan notions of an American civil religion.” Americans are linked 
by a providential narrative that has positioned them “as God’s chosen people.”20 
Similarly, Cordova examines the way the Catecismo del Pueblo, produced by Puerto 
Rico’s Popular Democratic Party in the late 1930s, relied on “an historical Christian 
narrative of oppression” as well as “the traditional catechism form of question and 
answer” to “interpellate a subject.” According to Cordova, the Catecismo provided 
Puerto Ricans with a collective identity; it “summon[ed] a people to take up their 
appointed role in history [which included] upholding a Christian duty to advance 
social justice by voting for the PPD.”21 In his study of nineteenth-century black 
nationalist discourse, Gordon traces the interpellative process, “rhetoric’s con-
struction of individuals into a collective subject,” from David Walker’s Appeal and 
Robert Young’s Ethiopian Manifesto published in 1829 through key performances 
in the 1840s and 1850s by Martin Delany, Frederick Douglass, and Henry Highland 
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Garnet. In a chapter devoted to Walker and Young, Gordon describes the way 
“black nationalism’s narrative structure … interpellated blacks into a collective 
identity by articulating nineteenth-century blacks in [a] rich, militant black 
history.”22 The analytic trajectory from Charland through Beasley, Cordova, and 
Gordon23 reveals two principal features: (1) analyses of textual interiors (particu-
larly narrative structures) which warrant interpretive claims regarding presumed 
discursive effect that (2) emphasize identity constitution.
James Boyd White elaborates his framework for analyzing the constitutive poten-
tial of textual interiors in two collections of essays: When Words Lose Their Meanings 
and Heracles’ Bow. White begins with the assumption that “text-making” is a “kind 
of ‘action with words.’ ” He continues by maintaining that texts come into exist-
ence “whenever any of us acts with words in our own lives to claim meaning for 
experience or to establish a relation with another.”24 We’ll begin with White’s con-
ceptualization of the way texts establish or create relationships with readers since 
this analytic path most closely parallels Charland’s sense of constitutive rhetoric.
White invites his readers to consider that the “interaction between mind and 
text … works like an interaction between people.” A text, White continues, “asks 
its reader to become someone and … by doing so it establishes a relationship with 
him [sic].” He offers this example:
Think … of what happens when a person opposed to racism is told a successful racist 
joke: he laughs and hates himself [sic] for laughing; he feels degraded, and properly 
so, because the object of the joke is to degrade. … Nor should he be ashamed that 
these possibilities are realized in him against his will, for a great work of literature 
might evoke such possibilities against the will of the reader in order to help him 
understand and correct them, and this would be an act of the deepest friendship. But 
the one who responds to the joke is ashamed of having this happen at the instigation 
of one who wishes to use those possibilities as the basis for ridicule or contempt; he is 
ashamed at who he has become in this relationship with this speaker.25
We think it useful to consider how Charland’s sense of constitutive rhetoric might 
be used to explain White’s example. Charland’s framework emphasizes a cluster of 
verbs – inscribe, insert, interpellate – that might elucidate how the joke positions 
the person to whom it is told. These verbs invoke a world where agency resides 
primarily in texts (or, perhaps more precisely, in the moment someone recognizes 
that they are being addressed), and effects are presented as a fait accompli. In con-
trast, White’s typical verbs – ask, invite, offer26 – envision a world of shared agency 
and self-conscious readers (and speakers/writers) capable of considering – perhaps 
accepting, but also potentially rejecting – textual solicitations. In short, White’s 
understanding of discursive action is more dialogic than Charland’s.
Charland and White both concentrate on textual interiors as they seek to disclose 
the way discourse shapes individual and communal identities. Their respective ver-
sions of constitutive rhetoric differ in that each approach has been formulated in a 
different conceptual register. In the present context, we do not believe it necessary 
to engage the broader conversations concerning agency, identity, and subjectivity 
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which these different registers facilitate; we do, however, think it important to note 
that because of its conceptualization of agency, White’s version of constitutive 
rhetoric encourages critics to move beyond textual interiors to examine exterior 
trajectories of reception and circulation – a position that is reinforced by a second 
mode of textual action that White highlights.
White argues that when people “claim meaning for experience,” they “must 
speak a language that has its existence outside” of their individual selves. “This 
language,” he continues, provides a person with “his [sic] terms of social and natu-
ral description, his words of value, and his materials for reasoning; it establishes the 
moves by which he can persuade another, or threaten or placate or inform or tease 
him, or establish terms of cooperation or intimacy; it defines his starting places and 
stopping places and the ways he may intelligibly proceed from one to the other.” 
The linguistic resources that “establish the possibilities of expression” both enable 
and constrain discursive performance. But this realization, White insists, does not 
lead to a deterministic conceptualization of language for as people claim meaning 
for experience, they “both act with and upon the language … at once employing 
and reconstituting its resources.”27 Extending White’s observations, Jasinski sug-
gests that “[t]he idioms of public life (for example, liberalism, conservatism, free 
market capitalism, pro-choice or pro-life, etc.) and the specific concepts that organ-
ize, link, and separate these idioms are continually reconstituted through quotidian 
interaction as well as more nuanced textual practices. Charting such alterations in 
‘usages’ is a central aspect of a constitutive rhetorical history.”28
Drawing on White’s more expansive understanding of discursive constitution as 
well as other strands of contemporary language and social theory, Jasinski has prof-
fered additional loci for constitutive analysis. For example, he argues that J. Robert 
Cox and Robert Hariman’s respective studies of King’s “I Have a Dream” speech 
illustrate “the constitution of [a community’s] temporal experience.” Cox reveals 
the ways King’s “metaphoric critique of gradualism” sought to constitute time as 
urgent, while Hariman more fully describes King’s complicated persuasive field in 
order to uncover King’s “subtle reconstitution of gradualism.”29 In addition to the 
discursive constitution of temporal experience, Jasinski suggests that “the ongoing 
discursive negotiation of the spatial categories ‘public’ and ‘private’ ” merited the 
attention of rhetorical scholars. He encourages scholars to examine how “a pleth-
ora of discursive forces (e.g., legal, feminist, children’s advocates, bureaucratic)” 
reconfigure our experience of the categories public and private. Jasinski’s final ana-
lytic locus is communal reconstitution. He observes:
Communal reconstitution can take a variety of discursive forms and rely on different 
textual practices as specific questions of social and political authority, power, bonds of 
affiliation, meaning, value, and institutional practice are confronted and negotiated. 
A history of American public discourse is, in part, the reconstruction and analysis of 
specific moments wherein an American community, and its constituent sub-commu-
nities, confronted threats to its existence (internal as well as external) and engaged in 
its own reconstitution.30
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Charland, White, and the many scholars who have drawn upon and extended their 
respective versions of constitutive rhetoric demonstrate the myriad strategies for 
examining rhetorical interiors. In our judgment, analytic explorations of the con-
stitutive nature of rhetorical exteriors are not as robust, but nevertheless point in 
some extremely promising directions.31 Three concepts are, we believe, central in 
any effort to track rhetorical exteriors: reception, circulation, and articulation.
At first glance, Leah Ceccarelli’s effort to unpack various senses of polysemy and 
Davis Houck and Mihaela Nocasian’s discussion of Franklin Roosevelt’s “First 
Inaugural” appear to have little in common, but in our judgment each of these 
essays illustrates how the examination of rhetorical exteriors – in each case how 
listeners and readers respond to a message – can help critics document a text’s 
constitutive potential as well as its instrumental situational impact.32 Ceccarelli 
observes that “[m]ost critics do not currently focus on how texts were received by 
their contemporary audiences, choosing instead to imagine how an audience in a 
particular rhetorical situation might have responded to the text’s invitation” 
(emphasis in original). She continues: “By engaging a close analysis of both the 
primary text and the texts that are produced in response to it, the critic can recog-
nize both polysemic potential and the actualization of that potential by audiences.”33 
In addition to providing evidence of the way readers and listeners actualize seman-
tic possibilities, we suggest extending Ceccarelli’s insight to examine how actual 
audiences engage a text’s constitutive invitations to, for example, inhabit a particu-
lar subject position, embrace a certain memory of the past, or employ the culture’s 
vocabulary of key terms in a certain way. Houck and Nocasian specifically draw on 
Ceccarelli’s insight and, in so doing, indirectly demonstrate this analytic possibility. 
For example, based on a careful reading of newspaper accounts of Roosevelt’s First 
Inaugural, as well as letters written to the new president, they observed that “[o]ne 
dominant interpretive pattern by which the public (and the press) reacted to the 
speech involved confidence.”34 The reception evidence they uncovered helps reveal, 
we would argue, the way many Americans in 1933 accepted Roosevelt’s invitation 
to reconstitute and re-embrace this communal attitude.
While Ceccarelli and Houck and Nocasian urge scholars to examine text recep-
tion, scholars of visual rhetorics encourage rhetoricians to broaden their analytic 
vision by tracing processes of image and “text” (e.g., specific arguments, tropes, 
ideographs) circulation. Extending on the work of Benjamin Lee and Edward 
LiPuma, Michael Warner, and Bruno Latour, Cara Finnegan and Jiyeon Kang 
argue that conceptual reflection has moved beyond a “passive transmission” model 
of circulation and has been replaced by a sense of “circulation as a constitutive 
process.” Following Finnegan and Kang’s recommendation to make “circulation a 
theme [in] our study of discourse” will force critics to recognize that, however 
powerful a particular rhetorical performance (and resulting text) may be, constitu-
tive rhetorics do not enter the public sphere fixed and fully developed.35 Public 
utterances issue constitutive invitations that are, in Ceccarelli’s terms, realized in 
acts of reception and subsequent circulation; those acts, in turn, define, shape, and 
even transform the utterance’s initially inchoate constitutive potential.36 Over time, 
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circulation practices produce a constitutive legacy that critical analysis can recon-
struct. Existing studies that trace the career of a specific trope or pattern of argu-
ment exhibit a proto-circulatory critical logic and, as such, illustrate some ways 
critics might analyze the process of constitutive circulation and the production of 
constitutive legacies.37
While the concept of circulation foregrounds the collaborative production of 
constitutive rhetoric, it does not provide an adequate framework for analyzing 
the way rhetorical exteriors actualize constitutive potential. When advocates 
shift a trope, an argument, or a visual image from one historically particular 
rhetorical situation into a new context or connect it to a new controversy, circu-
lation occurs via specific articulatory practices.38 In some cases these articulatory 
practices will highlight a diachronic dimension (the case in 1848 when the 
women at Seneca Falls appropriated the language of America’s Declaration of 
Independence and inserted it into their Declaration of Sentiments) while in 
other cases articulation moves synchronically (the case in 1967 when Martin 
Luther King, Jr. defended his decision to speak out against the war in Vietnam 
by identifying the ideological threads that connected his civil rights and antiwar 
positions). We also believe it worth noting that accepted articulations can be 
resisted, and efforts to disarticulate sutured concepts are part of the concepts’ 
ongoing circulation (e.g., Emma Goldman’s efforts in the early twentieth century 
to sever the link between the concept of “love” and the institution of hetero-
sexual marriage).
In tracing the two trajectories of constitutive criticism, we have shown how the 
interior trajectory, marked by a predominant interest in identity formation, is well 
established. We believe it appropriate to expand interior analysis to include exami-
nations of how texts invite listeners and readers to modify the meaning of a cul-
ture’s key terms, to reconceptualize a culture’s experience of public time (including 
the past), to reaffirm or reconfigure accepted demarcations of social space, and to 
affirm as well as challenge established sources of cultural authority, bonds of affili-
ation, and institutional relationships. The exterior trajectory is, as our discussion 
suggests, much less fully realized at present. By drawing on extant scholarship, we 
have tried to convey a sense of how critics might extend that mode of analysis. The 
case study that follows illustrates both analytic trajectories.
Before proceeding to the case study, one final observation is in order. As some 
scholars have already observed and as our case study will further illustrate, a con-
stitutive rhetoric does not exist in a vacuum. Its textual vehicles emerge and cir-
culate within a world of alternative, frequently competing, constitutive rhetorics. 
For pragmatic reasons critics will typically need to limit the scope of inquiry. 
Nevertheless, critics must recognize the multiplicity of constitutive rhetorics and 
the impact that they might have on each other. As we discuss more fully in the 
next section, the constitutive potential of the “principles of ’98” would be 
embraced by many Americans, but the Resolutions were never able to circulate 
with sufficient force to displace completely an alternative “nationalistic” constitu-
tive rhetoric. Tracing the subsequent circulation of the “principles” also reveals 
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how divisions and disagreements emerged within the political collectivity that the 
“principles” helped constitute.
The “Principles of ’98”: Interior Constitutive 
Invitations and Exterior Constitutive Legacy
Historians employ a variety of terms to describe the ideological conflicts that 
shaped American political discourse in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries: cosmopolitan versus localist, federalist versus anti-federalist, nationalist 
versus states’ rights, consolidation versus anticonsolidation, and liberal versus strict 
construction are some of the more common. While the terminology varies, the 
scholarly consensus is clear: During the nation’s formative period, the Constitution 
came to occupy a central place in the nation’s political imagination. But many 
Americans nevertheless imagined fundamentally different political regimes, with 
different visions of citizenship, different terms of value, and different accounts of 
the nation’s development.39 In his study of slavery and the US Constitution, Mark 
Brandon observes: “[A]t the level of … constitutive narrative, from the very start 
of the constitutional order there were two prominent competing accounts of the 
Constitution – what it meant and what it was.”40
These two competing narratives – or constitutive rhetorics – began to take shape 
during the 1787–1788 ratification debates as advocates committed to a more local-
ist political regime challenged the centralizing thrust that they perceived in the 
proposed Constitution. Their development continued in the 1790s as a congres-
sional coalition emerged to oppose Alexander Hamilton’s aggressive program for 
economic expansion. According to Larry Kramer, by 1800 “lines [were] clearly 
drawn between a Republican Constitution and a Federalist one.”41 Countless pub-
lic advocates and a considerable body of discourse brought these competing con-
stitutive rhetorics into existence and were responsible for their continuing circulation 
and transformation. Resolutions adopted by the Virginia and Kentucky state legis-
latures in 1798 and 1799 along with a report issued by the Virginia legislature in 
1800 whose content is often referred to collectively as “the principles of ’98” imag-
ined the most significant alternative to the nationalist vision. Uncovering the con-
stitutive invitations (or constitutive vision) and reconstructing the constitutive 
legacy of these four pivotal documents helps reveal the way discursive perform-
ances shaped the development of the nation’s constitutional order and allows us to 
demonstrate how discourse continues to constitute political thought and action 
long after its immediate instrumental situation.42
Thomas Jefferson’s Kentucky Resolutions and James Madison’s Virginia 
Resolutions were prepared to protest the 1798 Alien and Sedition Acts which 
Federalist President John Adams and his congressional supporters promoted. 
According to William Watkins, “[o]stensibly aimed at securing the home front as 
the [nation] braced for French invasion, the acts served the much broader purpose 
of Federalist political hegemony. Through this legislation, the Federalists sought to 
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restrain democratic-minded foreigners and silence all criticism of the national 
government.”43 The Alien and Sedition Acts consisted of four laws: The 
Naturalization Act drastically limited citizenship and suffrage rights; the Alien Act 
gave the president the power to evict any alien “he shall judge dangerous to the 
peace and safety of the United States”; the Alien Enemies Act allowed the presi-
dent to arrest, imprison, and deport any alien subject to an enemy power during 
wartime; and the Sedition Act defined sedition in such narrow terms that the law 
could be used to prosecute anyone who published anything negative about the 
federal government. According to Hartnett and Mercieca, congressional oppo-
nents attacked the acts on the grounds that they would augment executive power 
and endanger the Constitution’s balance of powers, were vague and invited abuse 
of the newly granted powers, and were potentially unconstitutional.44
President Adams’s congressional supporters discounted these concerns, and 
Congress adopted the acts during June and July 1798. Once enacted, the oppo-
nents’ situational exigencies changed: They now had to decide whether and how 
to continue their opposition. Watkins observes that “[t]hough the details of the 
planning phase of the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions elude us, the choice of 
state legislatures as the vehicles of protest is not shrouded in mystery.” “A custom 
of turning to state legislatures to rally opposition to an overreaching central gov-
ernment was,” Kramer avers, “well established” by the late eighteenth century, 
having been endorsed by both of the Federalist Papers’ principal authors: Hamilton 
and Madison.45 Jefferson’s Kentucky Resolutions were introduced in the state leg-
islature by John Breckinridge and adopted in November 1798; Madison’s Virginia 
Resolutions were introduced by John Taylor of Caroline and adopted the following 
month.46 The Resolutions denounced the acts as inexpedient and unconstitutional, 
and they invited Kentucky and Virginia’s sister states to endorse their vision of the 
nation’s constitutional order.
Analyzing textual interiors/reconstructing constitutive invitations
We want to identify four ways that the Resolutions invited readers to imagine the 
nation’s situation and emerging constitutional order. First, the texts located the 
Alien and Sedition Acts within an ominous narrative structure. Virginia’s Resolutions 
asked readers to accept the claim that “a spirit has in sundry instances been mani-
fested by the Federal Government to enlarge its powers by forced constructions of 
the constitutional charter.” The acts, Virginia legislators intimated, were part of “a 
design to expound certain general phrases … so as to destroy the [Constitution’s] 
meaning and effect”; they represented a “spirit” whose “obvious tendency and 
inevitable consequence … would be to transform the present republican system of 
the United States into an absolute, or, at best, a mixed monarchy.” The Resolutions 
established a narrative trajectory in which the “states by degrees” will be 
“consolidate[d] … into one sovereignty.”47 Kentucky’s 1799 Resolutions predicted 
that “if the general government be permitted to transgress the limits fixed by” the 
Constitution, “an annihilation of the state governments, and the creation upon 
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their ruins of a general consolidated government, will be the inevitable conse-
quence.” The shared fear of inevitable consolidation led Kentucky to conclude in 
its 1798 Resolutions that the assumption of “unlimited powers” by the federal gov-
ernment must be “arrested on the threshold.”48 The “threshold” image, a manifes-
tation of the commonplace locus of the irreparable, constituted the situation as 
precarious and urgent and invited readers, especially legislators in the other states, 
to ratify that definition of the situation through decisive action.
Second, the resolutions offered readers a narrative account of the constitutional 
order’s emergence. Kentucky’s 1798 Resolutions began by foregrounding the states 
syntactically as the sentence’s subject and as the primary narrative agent: “[T]he 
several States composing the United States of America … constituted a general 
government for special purposes [and] delegated to that government certain defi-
nite powers, reserving each State to itself, the residuary mass.”49 A decade earlier, 
many of Jefferson and Madison’s republican allies had attacked the proposed 
Constitution because they perceived it as a threat to state sovereignty. Thanks to 
the Tenth Amendment, prominently featured in Kentucky’s first five Articles, 
Jefferson repositioned the states and reimagined their role in the Constitution’s 
development. Rather than victims of a nationalist coup, Jefferson imagined the 
states as primary players in the new constitutional order. They constituted, they 
delegated, they reserved, and now – Jefferson and Madison suggested – they were 
authorized “to oppose in a constitutional manner, every attempt … to violate that 
compact.”50 As Virginia explained in 1798: “[T]he states … have the right and are 
in duty bound to interpose for arresting the progress of the evil, and for maintain-
ing within their respective limits the[ir] authorities, rights, and liberties.”51
Perhaps even more important than reimagining the states’ role in the constitu-
tional narrative, Jefferson and Madison reimagined the new constitutional order 
contractually as a compact.52 In so doing they adjusted old concepts to the new 
order: As Powell suggests, the traditional compact between “the governed and the 
governors … by which freedom was maintained” was “converted” into a new 
“political ontology” in which the states constituted and controlled national  power.53 
In the 1790s the states attempted, not always successfully, to exert control over 
national power via their representatives and a variety of expedience arguments. As 
early as the 1791 debate over Hamilton’s proposed national bank, the emerging 
Jeffersonian opposition invented a new argument practice – constitutional inter-
pretation – in their effort to frustrate Hamilton’s agenda and control national 
power. As Powell observes, “Americans have become so accustomed to associating 
constitutional debate with discussions about the meaning of texts that it is easy to 
overlook the significance of Madison’s [and Jefferson’s] textualism. English consti-
tutional argument, with which the founding generation grew up, was not funda-
mentally textual.”54 In short, the republican opposition imagined “constitutional 
debate” to be “essentially a legal discussion of the proper interpretation of a writ-
ten instrument.”55
Beginning in the early 1790s, Madison and Jefferson began inviting their fellow 
citizens to embrace a “radically textual understanding of the constitutional 
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enterprise.”56 This “rigorous textualism” was, Powell argues, “a central feature of 
the principles of ’98” and is, we suggest, a third constitutive feature of the 
Resolutions’ rhetorical interior.57 As Powell observes, the Resolutions “supported 
their claim that the Alien and Sedition Acts were unconstitutional with specific 
textual arguments.”58 For example, in its fifth resolution, the Kentucky legislature 
sought to subvert both the Alien and Alien Enemies Acts by citing Article One, 
Section Nine, which stated: “the migration or importation of such persons as any 
of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by 
the Congress prior to the year 1808.” The resolution then argued that since “a 
provision against prohibiting their migration is a provision against all acts equiva-
lent thereto,” giving the president the power “to remove them when migrated is 
equivalent to a prohibition of their migration, and is therefore contrary to the said 
provision of the Constitution, and void.”59
Republican textualism was, as Powell notes, decidedly “protestant.”60 While 
Jefferson and Madison understood the interpretive potential of precedents (and 
that understanding helps explain their determination to “arrest … on the thresh-
old” the unconstitutional expansion of federal power), they typically adopted a 
Protestant fixation with the text and only the text.61 Precedents were pernicious 
precisely because they led interpreters away from the authoritative text. The 
Resolutions also manifested the common Protestant commitment to “the legiti-
macy of individualized (or at least nonhierarchical communal) interpretation.”62 In 
its 1799 response to its sister states, the Kentucky legislature maintained that allow-
ing “the general government [to be] the exclusive judge of the extent of the pow-
ers delegated to it” was “despotism.” In good Protestant fashion, the legislature 
invited its sister states to embrace the proposition “that the several states who 
formed that instrument … have the unquestionable right to judge of the 
infraction.”63 The states, and ultimately the people – not the federal courts – were 
the Constitution’s authorized interpreters.64
While Kentucky and Virginia summoned their sister states and the citizenry at 
large to constitute a Protestant community devoted to upholding “the plain intent 
and meaning” of the “federal Compact,” their resolutions invited readers to assume 
a rather uncharitable attitude towards those citizens entrusted with the reigns of 
federal power. The Resolutions’ fourth significant constitutive invitation focused on 
the relationship between the practices (and texts) of those entrusted with power 
and the citizenry at large. Kentucky’s Resolutions insisted that “free government is 
founded in jealousy and not in confidence.” Confidence, the Kentucky legislature 
suggested, invites consolidation and “the destruction of all … limits” on power. 
Kentucky’s Resolutions continued: “[I]t is jealousy and not confidence which pre-
scribes limited Constitutions to bind down those whom we are obliged to trust 
with power. … In questions of power then let no more be heard of confidence in 
man, but bind him down from mischief by the claims of the Constitution.”65 
Jealousy, suspicion, or – in Powell’s terms – “ceaseless vigilance” were revealed as 
the hermeneutic norms appropriate for a republican regime.66 Virginia and 
Kentucky invited their sister states, and ultimately all Americans, to emulate their 
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hermeneutic posture and constitute a national community that distrusted those 
selected to govern.
When Virginia and Kentucky requested other states to ratify their vision of the 
nation’s constitutional order, they were rebuked. The legislatures of New Hamp-
shire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, Pennsyl-
vania, Delaware, and Maryland each sent replies to Kentucky and Virginia rejecting 
their resolutions. No state legislature sent a reply concurring with Kentucky and 
Virginia. In short, the states that chose to reply to Virginia and Kentucky’s 
Resolutions abjectly rejected them as erroneous, dangerous, and hostile to the 
Constitution and nation. In their immediate context, the Resolutions were instru-
mental failures.
Analyzing rhetorical exteriors/uncovering constitutive legacies
For pragmatic reasons, our case study focuses on how the Resolutions circulated in 
the period from the end of the War of 1812 (the beginning of the “era of good 
feelings”) to the end of the “nullification crisis” in the early 1830s. Our analysis is 
thus illustrative and not exhaustive. While our discussion concludes with the nul-
lification crisis, the “principles of ’98” continued circulating in antebellum America 
(culminating in southern secession). The “principles” were also appropriated by 
Northerners opposed to the war of 1812 (during the Hartford Convention) and 
federal government policies regarding fugitive slaves (through the efforts of state 
courts in Ohio and Wisconsin). They reemerged during the twentieth century in 
various contexts, perhaps most notably in Southern resistance to Brown and federal 
court-mandated desegregation.67 Efforts to rearticulate the “principles” in the 
early twenty-first century continue. William Watkins concludes his study of the 
Resolutions by observing: “If Americans embrace the Resolves’ lessons about ulti-
mate sovereignty and divided legislative sovereignty, then a renewal of federalism 
and a restoration of our Constitution is possible.”68 A comprehensive circulation 
study would need to examine the efforts of myriad advocates from antebellum 
America to the present day who have sought to rearticulate the “principles” into 
new contexts.69
The 1815 Treaty of Ghent concluded the War of 1812 and allowed Americans 
to refocus their energies on economic development. Congressmen such as John 
Calhoun and Henry Clay began to encourage the federal government to adopt 
various national economic development policies. At President Madison’s urging, 
the Fourteenth Congress quickly approved legislation enacting a protective tariff 
and creating a second Bank of the United States. But opposition to nationalist 
“consolidation” emerged among Virginia’s “old republicans” who claimed to remain 
committed to the unadulterated “principles of ’98.” These Jeffersonian purists led 
the opposition to Calhoun’s plan to commit the 1.5 million dollar bonus due the 
federal government from the new national bank to a permanent fund for building 
roads and canals throughout the nation (the “Bonus bill”). Rediscovering his own 
constitutional scruples, Madison surprised Calhoun and Clay by vetoing the “Bonus 
9781405178136_4_013.indd   325 2/9/2010   12:58:15 PM
326 James Jasinski and Jennifer R. Mercieca 
bill” the day before he left office. Echoing sentiments he expressed nearly 20 years 
earlier, Madison’s “Veto Message” insisted that (1) Congress could not exercise 
powers not specifically enumerated in the Constitution, (2) no “just interpreta-
tion” of relevant constitutional provisions (the “necessary and proper” clause, the 
“commerce” clause) could authorize the “Bonus bill’s” provisions, and (3) the 
“Bonus bill” threatened “the permanent success of the Constitution [which] 
depends on a definite partition of powers between the General and the State 
Governments.” While it reanimated important aspects of the earlier “principles,” 
Madison’s veto could not eradicate the reemerging nationalist (or consolidationist) 
constitutional heresy.70
In his first message to Congress, new President James Monroe endorsed 
Madison’s recommendation that Congress adopt and send to the states a constitu-
tional amendment explicitly granting the federal government the power to insti-
tute a range of internal improvements. In response Henry St. George Tucker, a 
Virginian opposed to the “old republicans,” helped to draft and then presented an 
ad hoc House committee report which argued that no amendment was needed 
because Congress already possessed adequate power to fund a system of internal 
improvements. In the subsequent debate, Speaker Henry Clay defended Tucker’s 
report after it had been criticized by Virginia “old republican” Philip Barbour. Clay 
began by insisting that “he had imbibed his political principles from the same 
source” as Barbour: “[f]rom the celebrated production of Mr. Madison, when a 
member of the Virginia Legislature, of the period 1799.” According to Clay, he 
and “old republicans” like Barbour “professed to acknowledge the same author-
ity”; their differences were “not as to principles, but as to the application of them.” 
He explained: “At the period which gave birth to those papers … [Virginia] bore 
a conspicuous part in arresting the career of a mad administration. The attempt 
then was to destroy the Constitution. … [Clay] begged the gentleman from 
Virginia to reflect, that that was not the only malady by which the Constitution 
could be afflicted; another complaint, equally dangerous to that Constitution, was 
an atrophy. … I do not go along with them in the water-gruel regimen they would 
administer to the Constitution, in constructing it to a dead letter, and reducing it 
to an inanimate skeleton.” But, Clay insisted, just because he sought to protect the 
Constitution from a different kind of danger, “let me not be charged with aban-
doning principle.”71
Clay’s 1818 performance, we suggest, merits attention for the way he both artic-
ulated the “principles of ’98” into a new context and reaccentuated their meaning. 
Old republicans drew upon the “principles” to accuse Clay and other nationalists 
of abandoning “true” republican constitutionalism (America’s unique “federal” 
system which privileged states’ rights) by trying to erect a consolidated national 
government via constitutional interpretation. Public suspicion and vigilance, 
Barbour and his “old republican” colleagues agreed, was necessary to thwart the 
nationalists’ consolidationist plot. On behalf of republican nationalists, Clay 
accused “old republicans” of abandoning “true” republican constitutionalism by 
trying to reintroduce the “water-gruel regimen” of the Articles of Confederation 
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via constitutional interpretation. When republican nationalists and old republican 
states’ rights advocates debated Joseph Hemphill’s General Survey Bill in 1824, 
Clay would more explicitly reject a narrow reading of the “principles of ’98” by 
articulating them to the failed Articles and, in so doing, reaccentuate the “princi-
ples,” rendering them compatible with the nationalists’ policy objectives.
Again responding to Barbour, Clay endorsed, as he had in 1818, “the old, 
1798, republican principles (now become federal, also), by which the Constitution 
is to be interpreted.” Employing the rigorous textualism that characterized 
the 1798 Resolutions, Clay appropriated a textual strategy Madison employed in the 
1800 Report, suggesting that “a better rule than that which [Barbour] furnished 
for interpreting the Constitution might be deduced from an attentive considera-
tion of the peculiar character of the Articles of Confederation, as contrasted 
with … the present Constitution.” Juxtaposing the respective texts, Clay observed:
It ought to be borne in mind that this power over roads was not contained in the 
Articles of Confederation, which limited Congress to the establishment of post offices; 
and that the general character of the present Constitution, as contrasted with those 
articles, is that of an enlargement of power. But, if the construction of the opposite 
side be correct, we are left precisely where the Articles … left us, notwithstanding the 
additional words contained in the present Constitution.72
While the clash between states’ rights and nationalist republicans over internal 
improvements and constitutional construction was significant in its own right, in 
retrospect it served as a prelude to the massive struggle over federal tariff policies 
and state resistance to those policies. In 1816 Georgia Representative Thomas 
Telfair refined republican textualism when he challenged the tariff ’s constitutional-
ity by distinguishing between tariffs designed to raise revenue and those designed 
explicitly to protect domestic manufactures.73 Virginian Barbour extended Telfair’s 
distinction in 1824, arguing that while the Constitution granted Congress “the 
power to impose taxes and duties … [that power] was given to us for the purpose 
of raising revenue, which revenue is to be applied to the ends pointed out in the 
Constitution.” Given the Constitution’s explicit language, Barbour conceded that 
a federal tariff was not “a violation of the letter of the Constitution,” but he never-
theless insisted that a protective tariff “violate[d] the spirit of the Constitution.” 
“[A]pplying a power for a different purpose from that for which it was given” 
might, Barbour feared, cause “the whole Constitution … to swing from its 
moorings.”74 As Jefferson and Madison had suggested in 1798, Barbour believed 
that the nation’s constitutional experiment depended on vigilant opposition to 
unauthorized federal power.
In the decade following Barbour’s speech, the tariff ’s constitutional status – and 
individual states’ ability to resist purported unconstitutional federal policies – would 
generate one of the early republic’s most significant crises. Throughout the crisis, 
the “principles of ’98” continued to circulate as anti-tariff advocates described the 
growing threat of nationalist consolidation and urged state legislatures to attack 
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the tariff ’s constitutionality.75 In South Carolina, proponents of nullification sought 
to declare it unconstitutional and void within the state’s borders. At the same time, 
nullification opponents sought to deny that doctrine’s constitutional foundation 
and disarticulate such extreme modes of state resistance from Jefferson and 
Madison’s resistance to the Alien and Sedition Acts.
Responding to the pro-tariff, protectionist movement which culminated in the 
July 1827 Harrisburg convention, President John Quincy Adams and Secretary of 
State Henry Clay supported tariff revisions during Congress’s spring 1828 session. 
But since it was an election year, the political machinations of Clay and Adams’s 
rivals – Martin Van Buren and those allied with Andrew Jackson – helped to pro-
duce what would become known as the “Tariff of Abominations.” Remonstrances 
against protectionism, the American System, and the Tariff of 1828 poured in from 
numerous states. When South Carolina’s congressional delegation and state legis-
lature requested that he help develop a formal statement of grievances, Vice 
President John Calhoun agreed, and in the summer and early fall of 1828 he drafted 
what would become the South Carolina Exposition and Protest. Calhoun was con-
cerned that extremists might urge rash action, so he sought, in the words of biog-
rapher John Niven, “to present [South Carolina’s] case in a cool, considered 
manner that would dampen any drastic moves yet would set in motion the machin-
ery for repeal of the tariff act.” Calhoun borrowed his machinery from the Virginia 
and Kentucky Resolutions: interposition and nullification.76
With Calhoun as his running mate, Andrew Jackson’s election in 1828 led many 
Americans to believe that authentic republican, states’ rights constitutionalism had 
been restored. But Jackson’s decisions did not always please republican purists, 
especially in South Carolina. When, in the face of known opposition from many 
Southern states, Jackson signed the Tariff of 1832, South Carolina responded. 
Drawing on his Exposition and Protest as well as his 1831 “Fort Hill Address,” 
Calhoun sent a lengthy and often reprinted letter to South Carolina Governor 
James Hamilton in August which rehearsed South Carolina’s emerging position on 
the constitutionality of the tariff and of a state’s right to nullify federal law. On 
November 19, 1832, South Carolinians convened a convention and, after five days 
in closed session, emerged with a Nullification Ordinance that echoed Calhoun’s 
1828 interpretation of the “principles of ’98.” Responding to what they perceived 
was an effort to subvert the Constitution and violate states’ rights, South Carolina 
declared the tariffs of 1828 and 1832 unconstitutional and unenforceable within 
its borders after February 1, 1833. On December 10, 1832, President Jackson 
issued a special Proclamation which addressed South Carolina’s threat of nullifica-
tion. In his Proclamation, Jackson unequivocally insisted that South Carolina had 
no right to nullify a federal law and that any state officials who attempted nullifica-
tion would be considered traitors and treated as such by the federal government. 
Undeterred by the tepid response from her sister states, South Carolina began 
enforcing its Nullification Ordinance on February 1, 1833, and made preparations 
to defend its right to do so with military force. On March 2, 1833, Congress 
authorized Jackson to employ military force against South Carolina if necessary 
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while also adopting a new tariff that it hoped would appease South Carolinian nul-
lifiers. Responding to these moves by the federal government, the South Carolina 
convention reconvened on March 11, 1833, and repealed its Nullification 
Ordinance.77
Virtually all of the significant rhetorical performances during the nullification 
crisis – from Calhoun’s various statements, to the public documents issued by 
South Carolina’s Convention, to Jackson’s Proclamation and the various state 
responses to South Carolina – were vehicles through which the “principles of ’98” 
circulated. Each of the participants in the constitutional drama defended his or 
their position as sound Jeffersonian republicanism. Advocates rearticulated a story 
of the nation’s founding, considered what role – if any – states could or should play 
in determining the constitutionality of federal legislation, and explicitly considered 
whether and how the “principles” applied to the issues which produced the crisis. 
Our examination of the way the “principles” circulated during the nullification 
crisis demonstrates precisely how complicated the question of tracing and assessing 
constitutive legacy can be – both for historical actors and for scholars of public 
address.
In his letter to Governor Hamilton, Calhoun positioned nullification upon the 
“plain historical facts connected with the origin and formation of the Government.” 
Calhoun believed that the “formation and adoption of the Constitution” were 
events “so recent … that it would seem impossible that there should be the least 
uncertainty in relation to them.” But when he surveyed what had been “constantly 
heard and seen,” it became clear that “there are few subjects on which the public 
opinion is more confused.”78 This confusion prevented Americans from recogniz-
ing that “the Constitution is the work of the people of the States, considered as 
separate and independent political communities; that they are its authors – their 
power created it, their voice clothed it with authority; that the government formed 
is, in reality, their agent; and that the Union, of which the Constitution is the bond, 
is a union of States, and not of individuals.”79 Drawing on the “journals and pro-
ceedings of the Convention which formed the Constitution,” Calhoun reanimated 
Jefferson’s earlier origin narrative. He pointed to comments made by Edmund 
Randolph, James Madison, and others during the Constitutional Convention to 
support his account that states were the primary agents in the Constitution’s devel-
opment and, as such, enjoyed primacy in their relationship with the federal govern-
ment. Calhoun maintained that his narrative demonstrated “in a manner never to 
be reversed, that the Convention which framed the Constitution, was opposed to 
granting the power to the General Government in any form, through any of its 
departments … to coerce or control a State.”80 Calhoun insisted that the conven-
tion debates “ought to settle for ever the question of the surrender or transfer of the 
power under consideration; and such, in fact, would be the case, were the opinion 
of a large portion of the community not biased, as, in fact, it is, by interest.”81 In his 
rendering of the Constitution’s development, Calhoun rearticulated the “principles 
of 1798” to constitute the people of South Carolina as the dominion of South 
Carolina alone, the states as perpetually sovereign governments, the people of the 
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United States as a fiction because “no such political body either now or ever did 
exist,” the United States Constitution as a “treaty,” and the federal government as 
a confederation of equal, sovereign states.82
Calhoun’s narrative shaped four public statements crafted by South Carolina’s 
convention: its Report, Nullification Ordinance, Address to the People of the United 
States, and Address to the People of South Carolina. Each of these documents further 
circulated Calhoun’s description of the nation’s founding and the relationship 
between the states and the federal government and invited Americans to emulate 
South Carolina’s vigilant defense of the Constitution and states’ rights.83 In his 
Nullification Proclamation, President Jackson explicitly rejected this narrative.84 
Jackson argued that Calhoun’s position constituted a “new doctrine” that trans-
formed the Constitution into no more than an “airy nothing,” a “wretched, inef-
ficient, clumsy contrivance.” Jackson insisted that no matter how much Calhoun 
and South Carolina wanted to believe otherwise, “our Constitution does not con-
tain the absurdity of giving power to make laws, and another power to resist 
them.”85 Not satisfied with simply subverting Calhoun’s narrative, Jackson con-
structed his own. If Americans “search[ed] the debates in all [the states’] 
Conventions,” Jackson maintained, if they “examine[d] the speeches of the most 
zealous opposers of Federal authority,” and “look[ed] at the amendments that 
were proposed,” they would discover that these documents “are all silent – not a 
syllable uttered, not a vote given, not a motion made to correct the explicit suprem-
acy given to the laws of the Union over those of the States – or to show that impli-
cation, as is now contended, could defeat it.”86 According to Jackson, “the people 
of the United States formed the Constitution, acting through the State Legislatures 
[and] in making the compact … we [became] one people.”87 Although Jackson’s 
origin narrative echoed the Preamble’s “We the People,” he nevertheless main-
tained that his account remained consistent with the states’ rights position of 
Jeffersonian constitutionalism.
“I do not claim for a State the right to abrogate an act of the General Government,” 
Calhoun wrote to Hamilton,
[i]t is the Constitution that annuls an unconstitutional act. Such an act is of itself void 
and of no effect. What I claim is the right of the State, as far as its citizens are con-
cerned, to declare the extent of the obligation, and that such declaration is binding on 
them – a right, when limited to its citizens, flowing directly from the relation of the 
State to the General Government on the one side, and its citizens on the other.
Consistent with the “principles,” Calhoun imagined a political world in which states 
were supreme; they controlled the actions of their common agent and reserved the 
right to reject the agent’s reading of the founding compact. In short, each state, 
“has a right, in her sovereign capacity, in convention, to declare an unconstitutional 
act of Congress to be null and void.”88 Calhoun described the states’ right to judge 
an act of the federal government as “the great conservative principle of our system.” 
That principle, he explained, was “known under the  various names of nullification, 
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interposition, and State Veto.”89 According to Calhoun, every state had the right, 
power, and obligation to be vigilant in its self-defense.
President Jackson responded that Calhoun’s argument was a “strange position”: 
strange in that it was new, unfamiliar, and odd. Jackson positioned Calhoun’s doc-
trine as novel while claiming the mantle of tradition for his version of Jeffersonian 
constitutionalism. He noted that “our social compact in express terms declares, 
that the laws of the United States, its Constitution, and treaties made under it, are 
the supreme law of the land.”90 Jackson argued that “the doctrine of a State veto, 
upon the laws of the Union, carries with it internal evidence of its impracticable 
absurdity” and that the nation’s “constitutional history” provided “abundant proof 
that it would have been repudiated with indignation, had it been proposed to form 
a feature in our Government.”91 He insisted that nullification was an “absurd and 
dangerous doctrine,” and he denied that it represented the nation’s constitutional 
tradition.92
While Calhoun’s Exposition and Protest and “Fort Hill Address” frequently 
referred to the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions and Madison’s Virginia Report,93 
his 1832 letter to Hamilton did not mention them by name. Whatever Calhoun’s 
reason for omitting explicit reference to the “principles of ’98,” the South Carolina 
Convention’s Report, Ordinance, and its Addresses to the Citizens of the United States 
and the Citizens of South Carolina explicitly articulated the Virginia and Kentucky 
Resolutions to South Carolina’s nullification doctrine. For example, its Report justi-
fied nullification by calling upon “the clear and emphatic language of Mr. Jefferson” 
and quoted at length from the Kentucky Resolutions to argue that Jefferson under-
stood “the true nature of the Federal Compact.”94 The Report claimed the author-
ity and borrowed the narrative structure of both the Virginia and Kentucky 
Resolutions to imagine a plot to subvert states’ rights and argue that “when the 
rights reserved to the several States are deliberately invaded, it is their right and their 
duty” to defend them.95 Furthermore, South Carolina maintained that “in asserting 
the principles, and adopting the course, which they are about to recommend, South 
Carolina will be carrying out the doctrines which were asserted by Virginia and 
Kentucky in 1798, and which have been sanctified by the high authority of Thomas 
Jefferson” – from “the pen of the great apostle of liberty.”96 Likewise, South 
Carolina’s Address to the People of South Carolina liberally invoked Jefferson and the 
Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions to support its arguments.97 South Carolinians 
insisted that nullification was consistent with the “principles of ’98.”
Among the formal state responses to the Report and Ordinance, Virginia most 
explicitly rejected South Carolina’s effort to rearticulate the “principles of ’98.” In 
its Resolves the Virginia legislature affirmed that:
they continue to regard the doctrines of State Sovereignty and States Rights, as set 
forth in the Resolutions of 1798, and sustained by the Report thereon of 1799, as a 
true interpretation of the Constitution of the United States, and of the powers therein 
given to the General Government; but that they do not consider them as sanctioning 
the proceedings of South Carolina, indicated in her said Ordinance.98
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Virginia urged South Carolina to reconvene its Convention and reconsider its 
Ordinance and dispatched the Honorable Benjamin Watkins Leigh to South 
Carolina to help its citizens discover the real meaning of the “principles of ’98.”99
While South Carolina’s Convention rescinded its nullification Ordinance, it nev-
ertheless crafted a Report responding to Virginia’s Resolves. While denying that it 
desired to promote the “invidious spirit of controversy,” South Carolina’s 
Convention continued to insist that it had read Virginia’s 1798 Resolution as 
announcing “nothing more or less” than “the remedy which South Carolina has 
resorted to, through her State interposition.” Yet Virginia’s “recent Resolutions” 
declared “that she does not regard the Resolutions of 1798 and ’99, as sanctioning 
the proceedings of South Carolina, as indicated in the Ordinance of her Convention.” 
“[W]ith all proper deference” to Virginia, in good Protestant fashion, the 
Convention announced that South Carolina would adhere “to her own construc-
tion” of the “principles of ’98.” The Convention’s Report insisted that “it is within 
the providence of God that great truths should be independent of the human 
agents that promulgate them. Once announced, they become the subjects and 
property of reason, to all men and in all time to come.”100
The Convention’s acknowledgment of “human agents that promulgate” great 
truths was most likely a reference to James Madison. Both sides in the nullification 
crisis actively solicited his support. Shortly after his debate with Daniel Webster in 
early 1830, South Carolina Senator Robert Hayne sent the former president a copy 
of his speeches. To Hayne’s surprise, Madison responded by attempting to separate 
the circumstances which provoked the 1798 protests from those which generated 
South Carolina’s theory of nullification. He also distinguished between the princi-
ples involved in each protest. During the summer of 1830, Madison revised his 
response to Hayne, which he sent to Edward Everett who, with Madison’s bless-
ing, had it published in the North American Review. In the letter Madison acknowl-
edged that “the nullifying claim for states” might rest upon the “proceedings of 
the Legislature of Virginia, in ’98 and ’99, against the alien and sedition-acts.” But 
such a claim, he continued, was a result of “erroneous constructions, not antici-
pated, [and] not … sufficiently guarded against, in the language used.” “[D]istin-
guished individuals,” Madison insisted, “have misconceived the intention of those 
proceedings.”
While Madison sought to disarticulate nullification from the “principles of ’98” 
by appealing to intentionalist hermeneutics, other advocates reanimated Madison 
and Jefferson’s Protestant textualism to reaffirm the link. During an 1833 debate 
in the Virginia legislature on whether Madison’s 1830 letter to Everett should be 
circulated in conjunction with a reprinting of Virginia’s 1800 Report, William 
Brodnax maintained: “Nothing can be more improper, instead of looking at the 
document itself … to be enquiring, thirty years after, on one of the body who 
adopted it.” As we noted above, the Virginia legislature refused to sanction South 
Carolina’s effort to articulate nullification to the “principles of ’98.” Yet the dele-
gates reaffirmed their commitment to republican textualism by recirculating the 
1800 Report without Madison’s explanatory letter.101
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Conclusion
In this chapter’s first two sections, we described how rhetoricians initially concep-
tualized constitutive analysis as a way of broadening the idea of rhetorical effect. 
Drawing on a variety of examples, we noted that critics have been concerned pri-
marily with the way discourse constitutes individual and group identities. We sug-
gested that critics consider expanding constitutive inquiry in two ways. First, in 
addition to exploring discourse’s capacity to constitute identity, we urged critics to 
consider how texts invite listeners and readers to modify the meaning of a culture’s 
key terms, to reconceptualize a culture’s experience of public time (including the 
past), to reaffirm or reconfigure accepted demarcations of social space, and to 
affirm as well as challenge established sources of cultural authority, bonds of affili-
ation, and institutional relationships. Second, in addition to examining constitutive 
invitations that appear in the text (that inhabit textual interiors), we urged critics 
to examine textual exteriors by tracing the text’s reception, circulation, and articu-
lation. Doing so enables critics to sketch the way constitutive invitations become 
realized, and constitutive legacies established.
We sought to illustrate many of our analytic recommendations through our case 
study of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions and the “principles of ’98.” Because 
public advocates can always engage in the practices of accentuation and articula-
tion, the “principles of ’98” and the specific constitutive invitations we identified – 
American citizens constituted as suspicious of and vigilant with regard to national 
power, the dangers of consolidationism, and the economic and political factions 
which promoted this brand of constitutional heresy; the states depicted as sites for 
organizing political resistance to national policy, for critiquing federal law, and for 
adjudicating constitutional controversies; constitutional argument represented as a 
form of Protestant textualism; and the founding remembered as a compact between 
independent and sovereign states – continued to circulate and shape the nation’s 
political imagination well into the twentieth century and have remained resources 
for (re)constituting our political imagination.102
While the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions’ ultimate constitutive legacy has 
not (and given our argument cannot be) produced, our account of the Resolutions’ 
circulation in the nineteenth century supports some provisional observations. 
When advocates accentuated the “principles” as a form of extreme state sover-
eignty and articulated them to demands for robust resistance to federal power, they 
failed to energize a national constituency or constitute the nation’s understanding 
of constitutional government. But despite the apparent rejection of this mode of 
accentuation and articulation, a vibrant tradition of states’ rights and state sover-
eignty persisted. And despite the best efforts of eloquent advocates such as John 
Marshall and Daniel Webster, Americans remained suspicious of national power 
and worried about consolidationist tendencies.103 If Americans rejected the consti-
tutive invitations offered by über nationalists and the advocates of nullification, the 
constitutive invitations that Americans did embrace are much less clear. Professing 
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their adherence to the “principles of ’98,” some political leaders tried to imagine a 
middle course between Robert Hayne and Daniel Webster.104 In so doing, Edward 
Livingston, James Madison, and others sought to imagine a federal constitutional 
system that represented a tertium quid between extreme nationalism and nullifica-
tion. The constitutive legacy of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions and the 
“principles of ’98” consists, at least in part, in our continued efforts to stabilize and 
inhabit this constitutional tradition.
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